

# DOMESTIC SECURITY REPORT SWITZERLAND 2006

## Summary

Overall assessment	82
Measures	84

## Overall assessment

### Subjective assessments of Switzerland's domestic security

In 2006, two surveys dealing with the general feelings of the Swiss regarding security, amongst other issues, were published. One was the Annual Survey of the Military Academy at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich, which was conducted in co-operation with the Centre for Security Studies at the ETH. The other survey on defence and security was carried out by the gfs-zürich. Both surveys come to the same conclusion: the large majority of Swiss citizens feel secure, but a narrow majority also believe that Switzerland could be the target of terrorist attacks. The surveys also reveal that, in comparison to the optimistic assessment of the situation in Switzerland, the Swiss see the global political situation becoming bleaker and tenser in the coming years.

*Swiss feel secure in Switzerland – bleak prospect on global political situation.*

### Islamist terrorism

Last year saw terrorist attacks by Islamists once again in Algeria, Israel, Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula and India as well as in notoriously conflict-ridden regions such as Iraq, the Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan and South East Asia. In April, a Swiss man was killed and a Swiss woman seriously injured in one of these attacks in the tourist resort of Dahab on the Sinai Peninsula.

*Europe remains arena for Islamist terrorism.*

Europe remains a significant region for militant Islamists to retreat to and prepare logistical support for attacks. However, with the bomb attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005, Europe also became an arena for Islamist terrorism. The foiled attacks in 2006 in Great Britain and the failed attacks in Germany show that the situation remained unchanged in the year under review. Switzerland, too, forms an integral part of the West European field of operation.

Islamist terrorism as expounded by Al Qaeda has become a global movement in its own right – a movement known as jihadism. Al Qaeda's ideology, strategy and tactics have attracted numerous sympathisers in Arab societies and in other Islamic countries, down to Muslim expatriate commu-

nities in the West. Its message, which expounds violent extremism, is propagated and advanced on thousands of websites and Internet forums. Based on information from the year under review, the original Al Qaeda can no longer be said to serve merely a strategic and propaganda function with little operational importance. On the contrary, the organisation remains sufficiently capable and innovative of directing devastating attacks in the West. Moreover, it was confirmed in the year under review that jihadists in the West operate to a growing extent without prior training, autonomously and at local levels, and adapt their activities to circumstances or opportunity. Switzerland appears to fulfil the requirements for a being a target, at least as far as the untrained corps of jihadists are concerned: the country is considered by jihadists to be a party to the crusade against Islam and the Muslims, it lies in the West European jihadist field of operation, and it has an active Islamist scene comprising extremists prepared to use violence.

*Devastating attacks testify to Al Qaeda's international operational capacity.*

### Islamist activities in Switzerland

There was no evidence in 2006 to indicate concrete preparatory activities, in the strict sense, for Islamist-motivated attacks in Switzerland. However, the Swiss authorities were able to identify a cell of presumed terrorist supporters. In May 2006, the Federal Criminal Police (FCP) on the orders of the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland (OAG) arrested several suspects. Other arrests were made during the year, both in Switzerland and abroad. Some of those arrested are suspected of having committed gang theft in order to finance the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat. It is also possible that the cell's leader contemplated carrying out a terrorist attack in Switzerland and joining the jihad. Other persons also planned to join the jihad in Iraq or in other countries during the year under review. Geneva played a significant role as a transit station for volunteers from the western part of Switzerland and neighbouring France on their way to Iraq. Other arrests included that of a Tunisian national in connection with a request from Italy for internation-

*No evidence for preparatory activities for Islamist-motivated attacks in Switzerland.*

al mutual assistance, and of an Iraqi Kurd residing in Basel, who was arrested in Germany on suspicion of carrying out financial transactions on behalf of the Ansar al-Islam, formerly known as the Ansar as-Sunna. In another case, charges were brought to the Federal Criminal Court, and in a further case investigations were concluded by the Office of Federal Examining Magistrates.

## Right-wing extremism

The total number of right-wing motivated incidents in 2006 remained more or less the same as in the previous year. The majority of events such as skin-head concerts, or incidents such as violent confrontation with foreigners and left-wing activists, were not politically-related; only 15 percent comprised activities such as demonstrations, the distribution of flyers and election meetings. Thanks to extensive security measures, there was no trouble at the celebrations on Swiss National Day especially during the national celebrations on the Rütli.

*Majority of right-wing incidences not politically-related.*

Repressive measures by the authorities have to be well co-ordinated with the preventive measures of the police because the organisers of right-wing events, and the right-wing scene itself, are versatile. Imposing short-term bans can be counter-productive, provoking activists to violence at events towards the authorities and police and to carry out their activities even more conspiratorially.

The “Partei National Orientierter Schweizer“ (PNOS) did not achieve any success at the two elections in 2006 at which the party put up candidates. However, it did establish three more sections and drew up a new manifesto after the Office of the District Examining Magistrates of Aarau passed judgement on the old one as being racially discriminating.

## Left-wing extremism

In 2006, as opposed to the previous years, the topic of anti-globalisation was far less often the

*More sympathy and solidarity protests on behalf of alleged political prisoners.*

focal point of violent action by left-wing activists. Anti-fascism, however, remained a focal point of the left-wing struggle. The year under review saw an increase in the number of sympathy and solidarity protests on behalf of alleged political prisoners. These protests took place mainly in

connection with the growing significance of the Red Aid, an organisation that links together left-wing extremist activities throughout Europe under the name of “Secours Rouge International“ (SRI). The SRI’s central secretariats are in Brussels and Zurich, the latter on account of the “Revolutionäre Aufbau Schweiz“ (RAS), especially RAS’ most important section, the “Revolutionäre Aufbau Zürich“ (RAZ).

*SRI central secretariats: co-ordinating left-wing extremist activities in Europe.*

Given its role in the SRI, the RAS has a great and, on the international level, growing importance, going beyond the scope of RAS’ function, which is to mobilise the Black Bloc at events. The Swiss central secretariat of the SRI focussed its co-ordination and networking activities in 2006 on Germany, Italy, Belgium and Switzerland, thus cementing the ties of one of its leaders that have existed for decades to activists of terrorist groups from the seventies and eighties.

## Illegal intelligence

The main targets of intelligence-gathering by foreign intelligence services were business enterprises possessing advanced know-how. Foreign intelligence services also attempted to gather information for use in the defence against actions by extremists and terrorists from abroad. With the help of journalists of media agencies from the respective countries, foreign intelligence services kept opposition groups from their countries under observation. Besides employing conventional measures such as personal contacts and addresses (Human Intelligence, HUMINT), foreign intelligence services attempted using technical means to gain access from abroad to protected data in Switzerland. Communications Intelligence (COMINT) is carried out increasingly via the Internet, and there is evidence of espionage attacks from regions of Eastern Asia specifically targeted at enterprises contracted by the government and those in the armament industry.

## Proliferation

During the course of 2006, several criminal proceedings in connection with the suspected violation of the Goods Control Act or the War Materials Act continued or were reopened. Two persons remained in detention in Switzerland in con-

*Suspicion of violation of Goods Control Act and War Material Act results in criminal proceedings.*

nection with investigations by Fedpol (FCP) and under the supervision of the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland on the Abdul Qadeer Khan proliferation network, whilst a third person was released in January 2006. Investigations were also carried out on a Swiss company suspected of exporting, or at least attempting to export, goods to a recipient in the Middle East working for a state missile programme. Proceedings were also opened in October 2006 against a Swiss firm with business contacts to enterprises known to be involved in proliferation. Furthermore, the United States of America froze the assets of a Swiss company that allegedly maintained contacts to an Asian company banned by Washington.

## Organised crime

As in the previous years, it is assumed that criminal groups from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) continued in 2006 to avail themselves of a widespread criminal network in Switzerland and use the country especially to

legalise and invest the proceeds of illegal activities. Due to their financial resources, such groups pose a threat to the Swiss economy, to Switzerland's democratic institutions and to the country as a financial centre. Criminal groups from South East Europe had a decisive influence on the crime rate in Switzerland in 2006, exhibiting the elements typical of all modern forms of transnational and global crime: a wide range of activities, versatile structures and international connections.

The task of the Swiss security authorities in this area remains to focus sufficient attention on the threat to domestic security posed by organised crime, and to implement appropriate measures. Up to now there is no indication of any direct link between terrorist or violent extremist auxiliary cells and organised crime. In view of the transnational nature of this form of crime, national and international co-operation remains the key to successfully combating organised crime.

*Criminal groups from CIS – threat to economy, democratic institutions and financial centre.*

## Measures

### Federal Act on Measures for Safeguarding Domestic Security

For some time now it has been difficult to gather the intelligence needed for carrying out situation assessments, for making decisions and for the timely recognition of hidden dangers; the mandate on intelligence is full of loopholes and no longer satisfies today's requirements for warding off danger. The current amendment of the Federal Act on Measures for Safeguarding Domestic Security (BWIS II) takes the new threats to Western Europe into account. BWIS II contains provisions for specific improvements in intelligence-gathering, which should bring Swiss practices into line with those of many other European countries. The revised legislation also contains provisions for the strict monitoring of the new measures. The draft legislation is expected to be passed by the Federal Council in 2007 and forwarded to Parliament.

*Loopholes in intelligence mandate – requirements for warding off danger no longer met.*

### Entry bans and individual preventive measures

Placing entry bans on individuals allows Switzerland to prevent foreign nationals from entering its territory either for a limited or unlimited duration of time. In 2006, Fedpol (Service for Analysis and Prevention, SAP) imposed a total of 255 entry bans on foreign nationals, 80 percent of which were in connection with violent extremism. Forty entry bans were placed on members of foreign skinhead bands, thereby preventing the dissemination of racially discriminating thought that accompanies such concerts. A further 147 entry bans were placed on foreign nationals for the duration of the World Economic Forum in Davos. And finally, an entry ban was placed on a Belgian citizen of Moroccan descent, widow of a Tunisian suicide bomber; the entry ban was placed on the woman, known for her Salafist conviction, following her return to Belgium.

*Tailor-made measures to curb violent extremism.*

Besides imposing entry bans, the cantonal authorities also ordered the removal of several German nationals from a skinhead concert. The cantonal police was further able to stop some privately organised events by contacting in advance the hirers of potential venues who then refused permission for the use of the premises.

On 5 July 2006, the Federal Council banned an Egyptian Islamist from carrying out propaganda activities that could potentially lead to jihad acts of violence against Switzerland. On an assessment that the person in question – a former police officer – posed a threat to Switzerland’s domestic security, the Federal Office of Migration revoked on 6 November 2006 his asylum status, granting him instead temporary admission because he could not be removed to his home country. On 30 January 2007, he was sentenced by the “chambre d’accusation” in Canton Geneva to penal custody of an indefinite duration. As no appeal was lodged, the decision gained legal force.

## Violence in connection with sporting events

On the 24 March 2006, the Federal Parliament approved with a large majority the amendment to the Federal Act on Measures for Safeguarding Domestic Security (BWIS I). The revised law and the accompanying ordinance came into force on 1 January 2007.

*Offenders to be registered in national Hoogan database.*

The new preventive measures, which include exclusion orders, exit restrictions, registration orders and preventive detention, are aimed at keeping violators known to the police out of stadiums and their vicinity. Once a measure has been imposed, the person is registered in a national centralised database known as “Hoogan“, which is operated by Fedpol (SAP). Thus, the full scale of measures to combat hooliganism will be ready for the UEFA EURO 2008.

## Guidelines for exclusion orders

In 2006, the Swiss Football League (SFL) standardised its practice of imposing exclusion orders. Under the new guidelines, bans may be imposed for certain offences and apply generally for a duration of two years and to all stadiums in both top leagues.

Since December 2006, around 600 persons have been the subject of an exclusion order either from the SFL or the Swiss Ice Hockey Association.

## Standard procedure for offences committed during the UEFA EURO 2008

For the duration of the UEFA EURO 2008, certain offences will be prosecuted in the host cantons according to a standard procedure. In 2006, the host cantons agreed on a catalogue of offences that typically occur at such events. Anyone accused of one of the offences on the list, will receive a judgement of the first instance within a few days. Until then, the suspect may be detained if there are reasons to do so, or may be removed from Switzerland if domiciled abroad.

## Violent propaganda

Part of the amendment known as BWIS I, which came into force on 1 January 2007, concerns violent propaganda. Under the amended legislation, police and customs authorities are empowered to confiscate material that incites to violence against people and property, regardless of its volume, quality or nature. The police and customs authorities are obliged to forward the confiscated material to Fedpol who then decides on further procedures.

*Amended legislation on violent propaganda.*

## Prophylax

The objective of the prevention and awareness campaign known as “Prophylax“, initiated by Fedpol (SAP) in co-operation with the cantonal police authorities, is to inform private enterprises and public institutions about the dangers of industrial espionage and proliferation. Anyone interested in the campaign can contact the competent cantonal police authorities or Fedpol. Reporting cases to the authorities, be it in connection with industrial espionage or proliferation, is useful in the analysis of the intelligence services behind such acts.

*Prevention and awareness programme – SAP and cantonal police join hands.*

## Human smuggling

The new Foreign Nationals Act, which should come into force on 1 January 2008, provides for more comprehensive and efficient means of combating human smuggling. Under the new law, gainful human smuggling is re-classified as a crime as opposed to an offence, and thus carries the max-

imum possible sentence of five instead of three years' imprisonment. In addition, the illegal exit and transit of persons as well as the deception of the authorities with the intention of entering, residing in or transiting through Switzerland, are now also punishable offences under the new legislation. These new provisions grant the authorities the legal grounds for prosecuting the arrangement or entering into of scam marriages, and the counterfeiting of visas and documents; all new methods of smuggling which can in future be prosecuted. Moreover, gainful human smuggling has been included as an offence in the Federal Act on the Surveillance of Post and Telecommunications and in the Federal Act on Covert Investigations, enabling the authorities to monitor and tap smugglers before and during the act.

*New Foreign Nationals Act: more comprehensive and effective in the fight against human smuggling.*

## Human trafficking

Switzerland took some important steps in 2006 in the fight against human trafficking. Firstly, under the new Foreign Nationals Act victims of human trafficking are exempt from the general requirements for obtaining a residence permit. The stay in Switzerland of human trafficking victims and witnesses is now regulated by law. These new provisions serve the purpose of victim protection and are intended to improve efforts in the prosecution of human trafficking cases. The new act also makes provisions for granting assistance to victims returning to their home country.

*In 2006 Switzerland took landmark steps to combat human trafficking.*

Secondly, the paragraph on human trafficking in the Swiss Criminal Code (Article 196 SCC, now Article 182 SCC) was amended on the occasion of the ratification of the facultative protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The amended paragraph, which came into force on 1 December 2006, makes human trafficking not only for the purpose of sexual exploitation, but also for the exploitation of labour and the removal of human organs, a punishable offence. Also, one-time offenders can now be punished for human trafficking. Finally, with a view to the UEFA EURO 2008, the Swiss government is also considering to support measures against human trafficking and forced prostitution.

## Fighting money laundering

In late September 2006, the Federal Council defined the guiding principles for incorporating into the Money Laundering Act the revised recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF). The aim of the amendment is to tailor Swiss money laundering legislation to the latest challenges posed by international financial crime. The list of predicate laundering offences is thus to comprise smuggling committed by gangs, counterfeiting and piracy of products, insider trading and market manipulation. In addition, the Federal Council intends to extend the scope of the Money Laundering Act to include terrorist financing. Also, financial intermediaries are to be released from the duty of diligence if petty sums are involved. However, the Federal Council does not intend to subject to money-laundering legislation cash transactions in areas of commerce such as art trade, trade in uncut gemstones, cut gemstones and processed noble metals, and real estate trade. A further development is the Federal Council's decision to separate the procedure regarding the partial revision of the provisions on insider trading from the money-laundering bill and give it preferential treatment. By removing Article 161 sub-paragraph 3 SCC, market-price relevant facts, including early profit warning, will henceforth be subject to the provision on insider trading. Moreover, there have been several calls for a basic examination of the current regulations on stock market offences and abuse of market power.

*Switzerland to amend money-laundering legislation with a view to meeting new challenges.*

At the beginning of the year, the Federal Council decided to integrate the state supervision of banks, insurance companies and other financial intermediaries into the Federal Financial Market Supervisory Authority. The Federal Council also intends to tighten the supervision of financial markets and place greater emphasis on it at the international level. To this end, it intends to merge the Swiss Federal Banking Commission, the Federal Office of Private Insurance and the Anti-Money Laundering Control Authority into a single agency, but to retain the self-regulatory system as provided by the Money Laundering Act.

## Economic crime

In cases involving economic crime, the confederation only has facultative authority. The report entitled “Prosecution at Federal Level“ by the project committee “Situation Analysis of the Efficiency Bill“ – otherwise known as the Uster Report – recommends giving priority to complex and resource-intensive cases involving economic crime. The Federal Department of Justice and Police (FDJP) decided in mid-December to set up a project group at federal level.

### *Project on Efficiency Bill II.*

## Corruption

The implementation of the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption had several consequences for Switzerland. First, not only active but also passive bribery in business activities in the private sector became on 1 July 2006 an offence prosecuted on complaint (Article 4a Section 1(b) Federal Act on Unfair Competition). Second, the passive bribery of foreign public officials or officials of international organisations became a punishable offence (Article 322<sup>septies</sup>, second and third indentation SCC). Finally, corporate liability was extended to include active bribery in the private sector, provided for under Article 102 SCC. Regarding the punishable acts listed comprehensively under Article 102 SCC, the Swiss legislator provides for aggregate criminal liability of individual offenders and business enterprises. The full implementation of the European Council’s Criminal Law Convention and its additional protocol should be guaranteed especially through mutual inspection by the contracting parties.

### *Implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on the Criminal Prosecution of Corruption.*

On joining the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Switzerland automatically became a member of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), a body responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Convention including bribery in the private sector, passive bribery of foreign public officials and corporate liability. The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) has provided a global instrument for use in the fight against corruption; one of the central themes of UNCAC is the recovery of assets derived from corruption. Switzerland is already a signatory to the Convention; the Swiss Parliament is likely to debate the message on the ratification of the

agreement during 2007. Swiss legislation is already compatible with the provisions of UNCAC.

## Weapons Act

Switzerland’s entry into the Schengen and Dublin agreements, which the Swiss electorate approved on 5 June 2005, means that the Weapons Act will be fundamentally adapted. In addition, the Federal Council has also proposed further changes to the law. The amendment proposals have been under parliamentary debate since 2006 and will continue to be during 2007. Amongst other things, the proposals deal with the question of whether conscripts should keep their service weapon at home, despite the fact that this issue is not regulated by the Weapons Act.

## Fighting child pornography on the Internet

Fedpol’s Cybercrime Coordination Unit Switzerland (CYCO), together with Swiss Crime Prevention and the nongovernmental organisation, End Child Prostitution and Trafficking, has launched a project aimed at blocking access to websites containing child pornography offered commercially and hosted by servers abroad. All Swiss providers have been contacted and asked to block voluntarily commercial sites offering such material for sale. Whoever now tries to visit a website hosted by a provider who participates in the project will be taken to a Fedpol site especially created to inform the user about the illegal contents of the site in question.

### *Swiss Crime Prevention Organisation and Federal Office of Police join in project.*

Swiss providers are required to store user characteristic data for six months. The Federal Council has ordered the FDJP to draft a report considering the extension of this storage period. In the year under review, Fedpol’s Paedophilia, Human Trafficking and Smuggling Coordination Unit, a unit of the FCP, coordinated numerous international investigations in cases of dissemination of child pornography material.

## Possession of child pornography material is not punishable in many countries

A study by the International Centre for Missing and Exploited Children with participation by

Interpol revealed that the possession of child pornography material is not considered a criminal offence in most countries.

### *No double liability.*

Moreover, legislation in those countries that consider possession a punishable crime is often wanting; child pornography and the possession of material is not considered a criminal offence in 138 countries, and as many as 122 countries have no laws providing against the dissemination of such material on the Internet. In summary, only 22 countries – among them Switzerland – have enacted far-reaching laws against child pornography.

Up until 31 December 2006, Swiss citizens could not be criminally prosecuted under Swiss law for possessing, disseminating, and producing pornographic material in these countries. On 1 January 2007, this legal loophole was plugged and things changed, however: Article 6 of the revised general section of the Swiss Criminal Code (SCC) on crimes and offences committed by Swiss citizens abroad provides that specifically-defined punishable acts committed by Swiss citizens abroad are subject to prosecution – even if such acts are not punishable under foreign legislation (waiver of double punishability). The list of punishable acts in Article 6 also subsumes Article 197 (illegal pornography), provided child pornography is involved.

## Jihadism on the Internet

Lately, cyberterrorism and the inherent dangers have increasingly been subject to discussion. The scenarios depicted often differ from reality. There is

### *Jihad websites not under comprehensive surveillance.*

no arguing that the Internet is growing in popularity with jihadists. The Internet has become a means of jihadist propaganda, fundraising, and planning. Moreover, information, numerous tirades of hatred and instructions accessible on the Internet help foster radicalization and the training of future jihadists. The Swiss authorities are not yet conducting comprehensive monitoring of the contents of relevant sites; however, with a view to duly considering the growing importance the Internet has for militant Islamist, efforts are being made for inclusive monitoring of suspicious contents on Islamist terrorism.

## Travel documents

Since mid-December 2005, data on stolen and lost Swiss travel documents has been recorded and stored in Interpol's Stolen Travel Documents

Database (STD). This database contains data on any travel documents stolen or lost in Interpol states around the world. Data on lost Swiss travel documents especially is also kept on record in the Ripol computerised search system and fed automatically into the Interpol Automated Search Facility database (ASF). Data processed in either system is synchronised by the hour. Interpol member states thus have access to information from Switzerland. Similarly, authorized users in Switzerland and Liechtenstein may search these databases for information recorded from sources all over the world.

## Identity documents

A passport featuring electronically-stored data is being introduced in a pilot project. Directed by the General Secretariat of the FDJP, this project has been assisted by the cantons, the Federal Office for Buildings and Logistics, and the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. This new generation passport warrants for greater reliability in identifying a person. Moreover, it will prove to be much harder to travel on a passport that has been stolen or tampered with; and so will be the obtaining of a passport surreptitiously by impersonation. This new generation passport has been issued from 4 September 2006 and goes by the name of "Pass 06". The final and extensive introduction of the Pass 06 will mark the end of the passport model "03". This will not take place before late 2008, when the Schengen agreement with Switzerland becomes effective.

*Swiss passport model 03 to stay till end of 2008.*

## New European Union civil aviation safety regulations

Following thwarted attacks in August 2006, all airports in the European Union, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland introduced on 6 November 2006 new safety regulations concerning hand luggage. Under these regulations, passengers are only allowed to take liquids packed in individual containers with a maximum capacity of 100 millilitres in their hand luggage. Moreover, liquid containers must be packed in transparent plastic bags, which are checked separately.

## Police co-operation agreements

In addition to existing agreements on police co-operation, Switzerland concluded several fur-



ther agreements in the year under review: the police agreement with Europol became effective on 1 March 2006; the one signed with Slovenia took force on 11 May 2006; the agreement with Latvia has been operative since 26 July 2006; and

### *Agreements approved in the year under review.*

the one with the Czech Republic came into force on 1 November 2006. The objective of these agreements is to enhance co-operation in preventing and fighting transnational crime. Furthermore, a supplementary treaty with Liechtenstein became effective on 1 May 2006, providing for co-operation regarding the Swiss information systems on fingerprints and DNA profiles. The sixth of July 2006 marked the signing of the agreement between the Swiss Police Institute and the European Police College. This agreement essentially concerns co-operation in police training. The conclusion of further co-operation agreements is planned in 2007, in particular the agreement with the United States of America on joint investigation operations in the fight against terrorism and its funding. This agreement has yet to be approved by the Federal Assembly. Furthermore, the agreement of 11 May 1998 on cross-border co-operation in matters of justice, police and customs, which was concluded with France, is earmarked for subsequent negotiations. The agreement is to be adapted for enhanced co-operation, particularly in resource-consuming investigations, catastrophes and emergencies. The Federal Council aims to conclude the extended agreement in 2007.

## International intelligence co-operation

Fedpol (SAP) works closely with authorities abroad that are charged with tasks on domestic security. It also represents Switzerland in numerous international committees. Intensified and widened over time and during the year under review, these contacts have fostered the exchange of security intelligence for many years. Thus, the Club de Berne, which includes European domestic and preventive intelligence services among its members, has grown to a membership comprising services from 22 nations. Opening its doors to the major civil intelligence services of South East Europe, the Middle European Conference (MEC) has laid the groundwork for bilateral co-operation with intelligence services of that region. Furthermore, and despite not being a member of the European Union, Switzerland has succeeded in con-

solidating its position within the Counter Terrorist Group (CTG), participating in the information exchange between the Union member states. Co-operation in the framework of the Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT) and Europol with foreign police authorities is effective. Fedpol (SAP) greatly profits from participating in the European Firearms Experts meetings, attended by representatives from 21 European countries. These gatherings provide information on arms smuggling, illegal weapons, and relevant legislation enacted in neighbouring countries.

*Continuous and increased exchange of sensitive security information.*

## Platforms of intelligence co-operation

In 2005, the Federal Council decided to create analysis platforms for co-operation between SAP and the Strategic Intelligence Service (SIS). Co-operation extends on issues such as terrorism, organised crime and proliferation. These platforms became operative on 1 January 2006. Co-operation resulted both in joint or individual analyses for clients. Depending on regulations on security and source protection, the members of the platforms have varying rights for accessing all information gathered by SAP and SIS on certain subjects. To the extent necessary for the fulfilment of tasks, access rights include information on findings of sensitive information gathering. The members of staff of both services work together in this field. All products are made available to the platforms. These measures helped to improve co-operation, institutionalise mutual consultation and reduce twin-tracking. An evaluation of the co-operation between SAP and SIS confirmed that this work format essentially is worthwhile. However, details on the procedure of information exchange still need examination; the Federal Council issued the appropriate mandates on 31 January 2007. Political supervision of the co-operation is assured by the head of the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport and the head of the FDJP. ■

*Better co-operation, mutual consultation and no twin-tracking.*



## **IMPRESSUM**

---

### **REDAKTION**

Dienst für Analyse und Prävention,  
Abteilung Analyse

---

### **REDAKTIONSSCHLUSS**

Ende Februar 2007

---

### **KONTAKTADRESSE**

Bundesamt für Polizei  
Nussbaumstrasse 29  
CH-3003 Bern  
E-Mail: [info@fedpol.admin.ch](mailto:info@fedpol.admin.ch)  
Telefon 031 323 11 23  
[www.fedpol.admin.ch](http://www.fedpol.admin.ch)

---

### **KONZEPTION, GESTALTUNG**

Martin Sommer, Romano Hänni, Basel

### **DIGITALER UMBRUCH**

Werner Druck AG, Basel

---

### **VERTRIEB**

BBL, Verkauf Bundespublikationen, CH-3003 Bern  
[www.bundespublikationen.admin.ch](http://www.bundespublikationen.admin.ch)  
Art.-Nr. 410.112.d

---

### **WEITERFÜHRENDE BERICHTE**

#### **UND INFORMATIONEN**

Website des Bundesamtes für Polizei:  
[www.fedpol.admin.ch](http://www.fedpol.admin.ch)

---

### **COPYRIGHT**

Bundesamt für Polizei 2007.  
Auszugsweiser Nachdruck der Texte mit  
Quellenangabe gestattet.

---

